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Abstract
An important, but little reported development in US business has been increasing numbers of employees with
ownership rights in the corporation with an increasingly large economic value. Most comes through
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), which were established in 1974 partly as a response to
anticipated shortfalls in Social Security, but also with the hope of invigorating the economy and distributing
the benefits of capitalism more widely through broad-based business ownership. Experience and research
indicate that ESOPs and employee ownership more generally do accomplish these aims, but large knowledge
gaps remain.
Research does confirm that individual employee-owners benefit from ESOPs. Equity comes on top of, not in
place of, other compensation. Employee ownership is also associated with considerably greater employment
stability and, in firms that simultaneously increase worker participation in decision making, the result is
increased job satisfaction, organizational commitment, identification, motivation, and workplace
participation. High profile cases accentuate potential risks through lack of diversification, but most employee-
owners are less vulnerable than counterparts.
Research confirms also that employee ownership, on average, leads to increased firm productivity, profitability,
and longevity. Evidence suggests that combining employee ownership with increased employee participation
may generate astounding returns on investment.
Little is known, however, about management of employee owned firms and few projects even attempt to
justify societal claims. Economists, managers, and financiers remain skeptical of employee ownership, and few
studies directly counter their concerns. Problems associated with employee ownership go unstudied. For all
the extent and appeal of employee ownership, it is on the fringe of both social consciousness and the academic
literature.
Employee ownership is one of the few issues on which the political left and right can agree, and is thereby
capable of attracting strong support across the US political spectrum. Recent concerns about social security
solvency suggest further inducements to widening ESOPs. Given this opportunity, increased knowledge can
help promote employee ownership, help ensure its wise adoption and successful implementation, and
intelligently influence public policy.
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Effects of  ESOP Adoption and Employee Ownership: 
Thirty years of  Research and Experience*
Steven F. Freeman 
University of Pennsylvania 
Abstract: 
An important, but little reported development in US business has been increasing numbers of 
employees with ownership rights in the corporation with an increasingly large economic value. Most comes 
through Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), which were established in 1974 partly as a response 
to anticipated shortfalls in Social Security, but also with the hope of invigorating the economy and 
distributing the benefits of capitalism more widely through broad-based business ownership. Experience 
and research indicate that ESOPs and employee ownership more generally do accomplish these aims, but 
large knowledge gaps remain.  
Research does confirm that individual employee-owners benefit from ESOPs. Equity comes on top of, 
not in place of, other compensation. Employee ownership is also associated with considerably greater 
employment stability and, in firms that simultaneously increase worker participation in decision making, the 
result is increased job satisfaction, organizational commitment, identification, motivation, and workplace 
participation. High profile cases accentuate potential risks through lack of diversification, but most 
employee-owners are less vulnerable than counterparts. 
Research confirms also that employee ownership, on average, leads to increased firm productivity, 
profitability, and longevity. Evidence suggests that combining employee ownership with increased 
employee participation may generate astounding returns on investment.  
Little is known, however, about management of employee owned firms and few projects even attempt 
to justify societal claims. Economists, managers, and financiers remain skeptical of employee ownership, 
and few studies directly counter their concerns. Problems associated with employee ownership go 
unstudied. For all the extent and appeal of employee ownership, it is on the fringe of both social 
consciousness and the academic literature. 
Employee ownership is one of the few issues on which the political left and right can agree, and is 
thereby capable of attracting strong support across the US political spectrum. Recent concerns about 
social security solvency suggest further inducements to widening ESOPs. Given this opportunity, 
increased knowledge can help promote employee ownership, help ensure its wise adoption and 
successful implementation, and intelligently influence public policy. 
* Funding for this project has been generously provided by Alliance Holdings, Inc. Willow Grove, PA. 
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Effects of  ESOP Adoption and Employee Ownership: 
Thirty years of  Research and Experience 
A quiet transformation has occurred in the ownership structure of US businesses over the past 
third of a century. Prior to the passage of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974, employee ownership was a fringe phenomenon in the US, limited to a few worker 
co-operatives in the northern corners of the nation. Although direct employee ownership and control 
is still rare, more than one in six US private sector employees now own shares in their company; and 
more than one in 12 US private sector employees now participate in an Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan (ESOP)1. As indicated in Table 1, more than 10 million employees now participate in over 9,000 
ESOPs; the net value of these employee holdings exceeds $600 billion (NCEO, 2006). 
A Brief History of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) 
The creation of the ESOP is usually credited to Louis Kelso, a San Francisco attorney and 
investment banker. In 1956, Kelso implemented for a San Francisco newspaper the first ownership 
transfer to employees by means of what later became known as The Kelso Plan. In 1958 he 
collaborated with the philosopher Mortimer Adler to write The Capitalist Manifesto outlining the 
economic, social and political benefits that would ensue from broad based employee ownership.  
In the early 1970s, the concept attracted an important ally, Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, the 
long time Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. Kelso and Long claimed that employee 
ownership builds commitment, which leads to productivity and profits, and argued that legislation 
facilitating broader-based ownership would not only increase corporate performance, but also ease 
workplace tensions, reduce disparities of wealth, and help build a better society. 
1  Sources: Logue & Yates (2001:1). Roughly the same number of employees own shares in their company through a 401(k) 
plan as through ESOPs, but 401(k) shares carry far more limited ownership rights. 
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ESOP legislation emerged amidst questions in this period over the future solvency of Social 
Security. When the Social Security Act was signed by President Roosevelt in 1935, one out of 70 
Americans were eligible for Social Security benefits. In 1939, Social Security was expanded to cover 
dependents and survivors. A 1967 comprehensive study revealed that one out of 17 Americans were 
then eligible for Social Security benefits, but that by the year 2000 one out of every three Americans 
would be eligible and that by the year 2010 it would be one out of two. To address this looming 
shortfall, Congress adopted ERISA, and within this context passed legislation established the ESOP 
as a means to supplement Social Security. The legislation included attractive tax and financing 
advantages to induce company owners to sell company stock to employees.2  
The number of ESOP plans grew rapidly such that by 1993, more 
than 9,000 plans were in effect. Although accounting rule changes 
caused most public companies to replace ESOPs with 401(k) plans, 
new adoptions have brought the number of plans back up to that 
1993 level and the number of plan participants has steadily increased 
throughout the period. Rosen (2006) speculates that this is due to 
increasing use of ESOPs in larger private companies and faster 
employment growth among ESOP companies. 
ESOP advocates believe that plan adoptions would be much 
higher yet if more business owners knew about the advantages of ESOPs. They also note that the 
same conditions under which ESOPs were established in 1974 characterize current US political 
2 ESOPs are retirement plans, not only for employees, but for qualified owners as well. Since 1974 there have been over 20 
pieces of legislation that encourage owners of private-held companies to implement ESOPs and share equity with 
employees. Tax incentives have been enhanced and modified by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the Tax 
Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986, the Comprehensive Retirement Security & Pension Act of 2000 and the American Jobs 
Creation Tax Act of 2004. 
Seller(s) are entitled, in most cases, to long term capital gains tax rates, and an S corporation that is 100% ESOP 
owned becomes totally exempt from all federal and state corporate income taxes on the above basis. Lesser percentages 
held by an ESOP also enjoy the same exemption. As legislation has evolved, benefits have been specifically targeted to 
independent business owners and employees who participate in these plans. The owner of a privately-held business can 
sell to an ESOP and defer all Federal income taxes, although Section 1042 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes tax 
deferment eligibility if the stock of the subject company is publicly traded. 
3 “Plans” include statutory ESOPs and also plans not formally designated as ESOPs but which are primarily invested in 
employer stock and offer distributions in employer stock.  
Table 13
Year # Plans
# Plan 
Participants
(,000s) 
1975 1,600 250
1980 4,000 3,100 
1990 8,080 5,000 
1993 9,225 7,500 
1999 7,600 8,000 
2002 8,450 9,300 
2005 9,225 10,150 
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debates. President Bush and influential think tanks have called for policy developments furthering 
their goal of an “ownership society.”4 Current concerns about social security solvency suggest further 
inducements to employee ownership legislation. A literature review of ESOP research is especially 
valuable now given both this lack of knowledge and opportunity for favorable government action. 
ESOP and Employee Ownership Research  
We now have had more than three decades of experience with ESOPs and a surprisingly vast 
research literature including hundreds of studies. Most of the employee ownership research seems 
credible, especially the cumulative findings on the benefits to individual employee owners and the 
firms themselves. Nevertheless employee ownership remains on the outskirts of academic thinking. 
Mainstream economic theory predicts employee ownership leads to underinvestment, inefficient 
decision making, inadequate supervision, or some combination of these (see Bonin, Jones & 
Putterman, 1993, for a review), and few employee ownership advocates have directly engaged these 
arguments. Few mainstream management journals publish articles on employee ownership. Rather, 
such studies are principally conducted and published within a small close-knit community; relatively 
few are peer reviewed or indexed. For all the potential appeal and, in fact, the extent of employee 
ownership, it seems to be on the fringe of both social consciousness and the academic literature. 
Peer reviewed research seems to have declined significantly over the past decade and a half, and a 
small group of researchers conduct almost all the research. A large percentage of the current 
research, including the work in the domain’s principal journal, Journal of Employee Ownership Law and 
Finance, is not peer reviewed. And although articles on employee ownership are still published in 
labor relations journals, there is little, if any, mention of the phenomenon in leading journals of 
economics or business administration.       
Moreover, employee-owned firms are rarely, if ever, the domains in which general management 
issues are studied. Business cases and teaching notes in management, strategy, and other business 
4 See for example, the extensive Cato Institute writings and website dedicate to the “ownership society” 
http://www.cato.org/special/ownership_society
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courses rarely present employee ownership scenarios or conditions. 5 Aside from a few high profile 
problem cases – UAL and Enron – employee ownership is rarely mentioned in the business press 
either. 
Research findings are mostly quite positive; Blasi et al. (2003) claim a confluence of favorable 
outcomes among nearly all empirical research studies on employee ownership. Yet few scholars 
outside this close knit group seem to be aware of the topic. Economists remain suspicious if not 
outright dismissive, and research published outside the small group of employee ownership 
researchers – mostly by finance scholars (Pugh et al., 2000; Weston et al., 1990) – emphasizes 
problems related to ESOP adoption and suggests that ESOPs have not led to significant increases in 
corporate performance. Although the quantity and cumulative findings of research on employee 
ownership may be impressive, lack of engagement with critics means that the research and the idea of 
employee ownership have limited impact in the larger world of knowledge and ideas, and leaves 
doubts about the assertions. I’ll discuss these issues further in the conclusion.  
Research Methods 
Almost all studies on the effects of ESOP adoption involve one of three kinds of comparison: 
 between-groups, cross-sectional comparisons of employee-owners and non-owners 
(who may be in the same firm or in other firms) 
 longitudinal comparisons, before and after the adoption or termination of employee 
ownership 
 within-groups, cross-sectional comparisons of employee-owners with different plan or 
employee characteristics 
To help identify and analyze what we have learned from research about the effects of ESOP 
adoption, I consider the effects upon (1) individual employee owners, (2) the firms themselves, and 
(3) the larger society. I follow with some general observations about ESOP research and suggestions 
for future investigation.  
5 In the 10 years I spent in the MIT, Harvard, and University of Pennsylvania business school systems, I never once heard of 
employee ownership in a research seminar, read of employee ownership in a journal article, or seen a case or topic 
covered which centered on an ESOP or employee owned firm -- with the exception of UAL, and a course on organizational 
design in the 1990s, discussing the unique tiered structure of a trendy Brazilian firm.   
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Effects of Employee Ownership and ESOP Adoption on Individuals 
The clearest beneficiaries of employee ownership are the employees on whom ownership is 
initially bestowed. They often, if not usually, gain substantial wealth; sizable ESOP benefits accrue, 
usually without the risk or sacrifice associated with business creation or purchase. Employee owners 
derive other benefits as well, including increased job security and work satisfaction, although these 
may be contingent on increased participation, not ownership per se. Employee ownership is NOT in 
general associated with increased risk to participants, but risks can arise from potential lack of 
diversification and increased management control. 
Increased Employee Wealth and Wages 
Of all the benefits ascribed to ESOPs, overall compensation gain for individual employees is the 
most unequivocal. Not only do workers gain a great windfall of company equity, but overall average 
pay of workers in firms with employee ownership is at least as high as—and may be higher than—
that of comparable workers in non-employee owned firms. Three broad studies of employee 
compensation in relation to employee ownership conclude that company stock appears to come on 
top of, and not in place of, other compensation. 
Blasi et al. (1996) found 8% higher average compensation levels among public companies in 
which broad-based employee ownership plans held at least 5% of company stock as of 1990 as 
compared to other comparable public companies. 
Studies of pay and benefits in ESOP and non-ESOP firms in Massachusetts (Scharf & Mackin, 
2000) and Washington State (Kardas et al., 1998) found that the levels of pay and other benefits were 
similar between these two types of firms, which indicates that ownership wealth from ESOPs does 
not substitute for present day income, but rather comes in addition to worker pay and benefits, and 
thus results in far greater overall compensation. By some indices, the overall average pay of workers 
in these plans appears to be slightly higher than that of other workers. This may partly reflect higher 
average productivity levels in employee ownership companies, the use of high wages in combination 
with employee ownership to motivate workers, the influence of workers in setting wages, or 
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beneficence on the part of management that adopts ESOPs. 
The exception to this is that in the early 1980s unionized employees at several firms accepted 
employee ownership in exchange for concessions in pay or benefits. In addition, some employees 
have taken lower wages as part of employee buy-outs, such as occurred in the United Airlines case 
(Lamberg et al., 2003). Among the nearly 1000 public firms that developed employee ownership 
stakes of 4% or greater over the 1980s, however, there were only 40 reports of wage and benefit 
restructuring linked to employee ownership (Blasi & Kruse, 1991).  
Greater Employment Stability  
Given the importance that most workers place on job security6, we might expect employee-
owners would exert formal or informal pressures to increase job security. Accordingly, Craig and 
Pencavel (1992, 1993, 1995) found that U.S. plywood cooperatives in the Pacific Northwest tended 
to adjust pay rather than employment as plywood demand changed. Blair et al. (2000) found 
increased job stability in U.S. public companies with broad-based employee ownership plans as 
compared to otherwise similar firms in their industries. Firms holding more than 17% of company 
stock over the 1983-95 period had significantly longer average employee tenure than matched firms 
without the employee ownership.  
Mildly Increased Job Satisfaction, Organizational Commitment, Identification, 
Motivation, and Workplace Participation 
Blasi and Kruse (2003) identified ten studies, summarized in Table 2, analyzing the relationship 
between employee ownership and satisfaction. Surprisingly, no link was observed between size of 
ownership stake and satisfaction levels. The studies indicate that satisfaction and motivation derive 
not from size of ownership stake or even ownership per se, but rather from increased participation. 
Two studies find higher satisfaction, commitment, and motivation among employee-owners. One 
study on behavioral effects (Kruse, 1984, see Table 4) found lower satisfaction among employee-
owners compared to a nationwide sample, this in an ESOP company where the union had lost a 
6 A majority of Americans say that if they owned company stock and an outside investor was attempting a takeover, they 
would not sell even for twice the market value of the stock (EBRI/ Gallup poll, 1994, summarized in Kruse & Blasi, 1999). 
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bitter strike the year before. (Reminders by management that the strike would hurt ESOP account 
values brought the responses "We don't vote. We don't control the company. We don't care."). The 
remaining studies found only highly contingent differences between owners and non-owners, or 
before and after an employee buyout. A surprising finding is the absence of any link between size of 
ownership stake and satisfaction levels. 
Table 2. Key Employee Owner Satisfaction Studies 
Comparison Authors Source of data Explanatory variables Main results 
Greenberg 
(1980) 
Surveys of 550 employees in 4 US 
plywood coops and large non-
employee owned firms 
Co-op 
member-
ship
Higher work satisfaction for co-op members
Hammer,
Stern & 
Gurdon
(1982) 
Surveys of 233 employees in 2 firms 
saved by employee buyouts, 1-2 
years later 
Owner-
ship
status,
stake
Lower alienation from work among owners in 
both firms; Satisfaction similar for owners and 
non-owners in one firm; higher for some 
owners in other; Not linked to ownership stake 
Between 
employee 
owners 
and non-
owners 
Long 
(1978a, b; 
1980) 
Survey of 87 employees 6 months 
after 70% bought trucking co., and 
at knitting mill w/30% owners 
Owner-
ship
status
Higher satisfaction for owners, but due to 
perceived participation rather than simple 
ownership status 
Pendleton, 
Wilson & 
Wright (1998) 
Three surveys of 234 
employees in UK Bus Co, 
ESOP adopters.  
Perceptions of 
ownership, 
process
participation 
Opportunities for participating in decision-
making are more important than ownership per 
se in generating feelings of ownership, which 
are significantly associated with higher levels 
of commitment and satisfaction 
Long  
(1982) 
Three surveys of 147, 184, 
and 248 employees, first one 
prior to employe purchase of 
Canadian electronics firm 
Employee buy-
out after first 
survey, 
Ownership stake
Satisfaction up for those perceiving increased 
participation, but down for those perceiving no 
change in participation. No relation to 
ownership stake 
Pre-
ESOP/
Post - 
ESOP
Tucker, Nock 
& Toscano 
(1989) 
Two surveys of 38 & 39 
employees at small, fast 
growing US firm 
ESOP adoption 
after first survey
Satisfaction up (but sample too small for 
significant results) 
Buchko
(1993)
Survey of 218 employees 
in an ESOP company, 1987 
ESOP account value, 
perceived influence Between groups of 
employee-
owners 
French & 
Rosenstein 
(1984) 
Survey of 560 employees in 
firm with direct ownership 
Ownership stake, perceived 
influence in job & co. 
Perceived influence had positive 
effect on satisfaction, while 
ESOP account value had no 
significant effect.
Related studies tend to show an association between employee ownership and organizational 
commitment and identification (12 studies), motivation (6 studies), and participation and influence in 
decisions (11 studies). I review these in the next section because they are understood primarily as 
instrumental goods that improve performance for the firm, rather than a direct benefit to the 
employees themselves. That said, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) and others in positive 
psychology (e.g., Turner, Baring & Zacharatos, 2002) and positive organizational scholarship 
(Cameron, Dutton & Quinn, 2003) attribute extensive well-being to people who feel a sense of 
commitment, identification, motivation, and participation in their work. Prominent scholars such as 
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Csikszentmihalyi (1990) claim that these are precisely the most important elements of work life, and 
that it is this attachment to and identification with work that makes for a life of meaning and 
satisfaction. 
Increased Risk is Generally Not the Case  
One of the most important threats that ESOPs hypothetically pose to employee well-being is risk 
from lack of diversification. This risk has been highlighted in big news stories about collapses at 
Enron,7 Polaroid,8 and United Airlines.9 In the latter two cases, the failures seem at least partially due 
to poorly designed mechanisms of employee ownership. Any time a firm goes bankrupt, nearly all 
equity is lost, so if workers hold a significant portion of their retirement portfolio in their corporate 
stock can lose not only their jobs and careers, but their retirement stakes as well. Counterpoised 
against this risk are benefits posited – that workers who own stock will be more productive, loyal, 
and profit conscious, and thus decrease the likelihood of firm decline. 
Kruse (1996) suggests that employee owners generally have superior retirement provisions even 
excepting their ESOP stake, because their firms are far more likely than their industry counterparts to 
maintain defined benefit pension plans. But of course, if a company goes bankrupt, defined benefit 
pensions are lost too. More research is needed on the extent of this risk and whether ESOPs result in 
too many eggs in one basket, or if, in fact, the eggs best belong right there with the hens that make 
them. 
7 At Enron, ESOP employee losses were further exacerbated by precipitous decline of the Enron 401(k), 58% of which was 
invested in Enron stock. And much of that investment seems not only violated plan managers’ fiduciary responsibilities, 
but was criminally invested so as to artificially prop up share price.  
8 In 2001, six thousand Polaroid workers, lost not only retirement health care severance packages and in many cases their 
jobs, but also a $300 million ESOP investment. Beginning in 1988, workers at the Waltham, Mass. instant camera 
manufacturer gave up 8% of their salary to underwrite an ESOP, created to thwart a corporate takeover. Unfortunately, 
Polaroid was slow to react to the digital revolution and began to lose money in the 1990s. From 1995 to 1998, the 
company racked up $359 million in losses. As its balance sheet deteriorated, so did the value of its stock, including shares 
in the ESOP. In October 2001, Polaroid sought bankruptcy protection from creditors. A company-appointed trustee sold 
the employee stake for 9¢ per share, having plummeted from $60 in 1997.  
9 Lamberg, et al (2003) argued that lack of central authority caused suboptimal strategic stakeholder negotiation at United 
Airlines, causing the firm to fall into bankruptcy (and employees to lose their investment). The empirical generalizability of 
the United Airlines case is questionable because it is an ESOP that many proponents considered ill-advised, and most 
considered badly structured. On the other hand, economists are inclined to see United Airlines’ problems as 
representative. Ronald Coase won a Nobel Prize in Economics for identifying internal negotiations and suboptimization as 
a general economic problem for which his “Theory of the Firm,” that is to say the conventionally governed firm is a 
solution.
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Summary of ESOP Effects upon Individuals  
Research suggests almost entirely positive effects for individuals of ESOP adoption and, more 
generally, employee ownership. Significant valuations of company stock appear in addition to, and 
not in place of, other compensation. Likewise, company stock accumulations tend to complement 
diverse retirement benefits, although employees can be vulnerable to irresponsible concentration á la 
Enron. Another valuable benefit is increased job security. Finally, job satisfaction is positively 
correlated with ESOP adoption, although not markedly so.  
Limited gains in job satisfaction may be attributable to provisions of ESOP law that maintains or 
even concentrates voting shares in the hands of management. Thus, although ESOP employees 
automatically gain a share of the wealth, they do not automatically gain a share of power. Increases in 
satisfaction seem to come only from an increase in participation, which is not always forthcoming.  
An important gap in the literature on ESOP effects upon individuals is lack of even a single study 
documenting the effects upon the owners who lead the transition. In our interactions with ESOP 
officers10, we see sometimes profound sentiments relating to ESOP transition. The decision whether 
to adopt an ESOP and the nature of the ESOP to adopt is in the hands of the owner; research on the 
impact of the adoption for him or her could provide a much stronger basis for helping others to 
make that decision. 
In addition to these direct effects, employees and owners are also affected by the impact of 
ESOP adoption on the firm.  
Effects of Employee Ownership and ESOP Adoption on Firms 
Most research on employee ownership shows robust, positive, firm-level effects. These studies 
show that employee owned firms are more productive and profitable, survive longer, and result in 
better shareholder returns. Adoption of ESOPs result in better post-adoption performance 
compared to pre-adoption performance and also compared to matched firms. The mechanisms by 
10 The ESOP Association and the University of Pennsylvania Center for Organizational Dynamics, have partnered to offer 
Chief Executive Officers of ESOP companies a Certificate Program on Leading in an Employee Ownership Setting,
http://www.esopassociation.org/meetings/meetings_2005_CEOLead.asp
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which these gains are realized are still not well understood, but researchers have begun to investigate. 
Some studies from prestigious journals of economics and finance challenge these claims, and 
economic theory is generally suspect of employee ownership. Two opposite risks are identified – 
control that is either too highly centralized despite broad ownership, or insufficiently centralized.  
Increased Productivity and Profitability  
Kruse and Blasi (1997: 134-136) summarize eleven studies evaluating comparison of (a) 
performance before and after adoption of the ESOP, (b) ESOP to non-ESOP firms, and (c) post- 
adoption performance to matched non-ESOP firms. Most of the studies find small positive, but 
statistically insignificant effects. Only two of the studies – on post-adoption performance 
(Kumbhaker & Dunbar 1993; Mitchell et al., 1990) – find significant differences. Park and Seng 
(1995), additionally, find significantly better post-adoption performance, but only in firms with 
outside blockholders (possibly due to greater monitoring of management). Conducting meta-analytic 
statistical tests on all eleven studies, however, Kruse and Blasi (1997: 137) are able to conclude that 
on average in all the performance categories, ESOP companies do better per year than non-ESOP 
companies and that companies do better post-adoption than pre-adoption. They estimate the average 
effect across tests and across studies to be approximately 4% annually.  
Increased Resilience and Likelihood of Firm Survival  
Research indicates not only that employee-owned firms are more profitable and productive, but 
that they also survive longer. Several large-scale studies show that employee-owned firms are 
significantly less likely than their counterparts to go bankrupt or disappear for any reason at all.  
Park, Kruse and Sesil (2004) tracked data on all U.S. public companies as of 1988, following them 
through 2001. Companies with employee ownership stakes of 5% or more were only 76% as likely as 
firms without employee ownership to disappear in this period. Out of 245 firms in which employees 
owned 5% or more of the company in 1988, 124 (50.6%) were still in business in 2001; only 97 
(41.8%) out of a matched sample of 232 non-employee-owned firms were still in business in 2001. 
(The entire 1988 population of non-employee owned public firms consisted of 5432, of which 2301, 
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42.4%, had survived.) In every category tracked (Merger or Acquisition, Bankruptcy, Liquidation, 
Reverse Acquisition, Leveraged Buyout, Privatization, Other, and Missing) non-employee owned 
firms disappeared at a greater rate than employee-owned firms  
These findings were congruent with those of Blair et al. (2000). Their study tracking U.S. public 
companies from 1983, found that those with substantial employee ownership stakes were 20% more 
likely than their industry counterparts to survive through 1995.  
In a current project reported on the NCEO website, Blasi and Kruse (2007) track all privately held 
companies with ESOPs in 1988, and found they had similarly higher survival rates than closely 
matched firms without ESOPs. Among 1176 private companies with ESOPs in 1988, 69.6% 
survived through 1999, compared to only 54.8% of non-ESOP companies in the same industry and 
of the same size.  
Benefits of Firm Survival and Employment Stability 
Although firm survival may seem to be a clear-cut good, economists have traditionally been 
dubious about the benefits of enhanced organizational survival. Schumpeter coined the term 
“creative destruction,” of firms dying a timely death, but in our rapidly changing times, we can 
increasingly appreciate the value of organizational stability even aside from the benefits to individuals 
with ownership stakes.  It can take decades to develop a robust organizational model. Premature 
organizational collapse leads to squandered resources and intellectual capital disintegrates as teams 
disperse – it takes years to redeploy people. Moreover, firms are vessels into which we pour energies 
and passions; their longevity can be seen as a good in itself. 
In the previous section, it was noted that employee ownership results in greater employment 
stability. But does that benefit the firm? Traditionally, economists and many investors have suspected 
that job stability comes at a cost to organizations. But as job stability has declined over the past 
generation, the benefits of job stability for the firm (as well as the employees themselves) have 
become more apparent: Work groups (Freeman et al., 2003) and organizations (e.g., Pfeffer, 2005) 
that hold together longer function better. Blair et al. (2000) and Craig and Pencavel (1995) find that 
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employee owned firms with higher job stability also had higher productivity and better stock market 
performance than comparable non-employee owned firms. 
No one has studied ESOP resilience or an ability to deal with adversity (e.g., Freeman, 2004) per 
se, but Estrin and Jones (1992) found that French worker cooperatives were more likely to survive 
than their non-employee owned counterparts under a variety of conditions. Iqbal et al. (2000) found 
that firms with ESOPs were able to improve operating performance when their stock prices were 
falling as well as when stock prices were rising. 
Shareholder Return – The Positive View 
Blasi et al. (2003: 155-157) analyzed the entire universe of seventy empirical studies they could 
find on the effects of employee stock ownership, broad based stock options, profit sharing, and 
employee participation (which they describe as the four key aspects of “partnership capitalism”). 
They report,  
The results surprised even us, not because they were so positive, but because they were so 
extensive and so uniform.… The most striking conclusion: Every major study found that investors 
came out ahead if their company adopted key elements of partnership capitalism.… 
They found that adoption of any of the four forms of partnership capitalism results, on average, 
in the gains listed in Table 3: 
Table 3. Investor Gains from Sharing Ownership (Blasi et al., 2003) 
Performance measure Gain from employee ownership 
Average employee ownership 8% -- after dilution 
Productivity 4%
Return on equity 14%
Return on assets 12%
Profit margins 11%
Total shareholder returns 2% -- after dilution! 
They explain: 
In other words, the studies show that on average, companies and their investors made a profit on 
partnership approaches, including stock options, over and above any ownership they dished out 
to employees. They gave workers an 8 percent ownership stake, and in return enjoyed an 
average of a 2 percentage point higher return on the diluted shares they still held. 
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Mechanisms by which ESOPs Perform Better? 
Assuming that ESOPs do, in fact, perform better (see dissenting views in the next section), the 
mechanisms through which ESOPs may affect performance are not well established.  
Many studies investigate the relationship between employee ownership and organizational 
commitment and identification (12 studies); motivation (6 studies); participation and influence in 
decisions (11 studies); and behavioral measures such as turnover and absenteeism (7 studies). All 
these presumably have a beneficial effect on the firm (McGregor, 1960), but the link has proven 
surprisingly elusive and contingent (Thompson, 1967). So while it is a good bet that these relate to 
overall firm improvement, few studies as yet verify the links.  
I review in this section important studies that credibly explain the relationship between employee 
ownership and these theorized performance factors, emphasizing those that directly test factors as 
mechanisms affecting ESOP performance. 
Benefits from Employee Participation in Decision Making? 
The studies previously related on satisfaction (Table 1) highlighted the importance of 
participation. Two additional studies interacted productivity growth explicitly with measures of 
employee participation in decisions. Quarrey and Rosen (1993) found significantly higher post-
adoption growth for ESOP companies that had participation groups and for ESOP companies in 
which management perceived higher worker influence (compared to both similar non-ESOP 
companies and to pre-adoption growth). The U.S. GAO (1987) study found significant increases in 
productivity where the companies reported high levels of worker influence, but only when the 
companies reported an increase in employee voting rights or worker influence after adoption. In 
addition, Kardas (1994) and Kardas, et al. (1994) found higher sales and employment growth in 
participatory ESOP companies compared to non-participatory ESOP companies and non-ESOP 
companies. 
While employee participation may be important in how employees view employee ownership, 
there is no automatic connection between degree the size of an employee ownership stake and the 
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rights associated with that ownership, or, for that matter, between ownership rights and the perceived, 
or even desired, influence and participation in decision-making.11
Greater Organizational Commitment and Identification?  
All eight studies of employee owner satisfaction (Table 2) also measured organizational 
commitment. The results suggest that employee ownership is slightly more highly correlated with 
organizational commitment than with employee satisfaction. But as with satisfaction, the results are 
mixed and contingent, as they also were for four additional studies (Rhodes & Steers, 1981, 141 
employees at a US Plywood coop as compared with a conventional firm; Russell et al., 1979, 
comparing 165 employee owners at a refuse collection firm with 565 non-owners; Oliver’s 1984 
study of 6 Scottish co-ops, and his 1990 survey of employees at a longstanding employee-owned UK 
petrochemical firm). Employee owners have higher commitment in most studies, but not all 
(Hammer et al., 1982; Long, 1980). As with satisfaction, the role of perceived influence/ participation 
in decisions appears strong (Rhodes & Steers, 1981; Long 1980; Buchko, 1993; French et al., 1984). 
Oliver (1990) found that employee-owners with "participatory" values (putting a premium on the 
opportunity to participate in workplace decisions, and on good relations with co-workers and 
managers) had higher commitment than those with "instrumental" values (focusing on size and 
fairness of income, job security, and work conditions). 
The link from commitment to firm performance is not rigorously made in any study, although 
Brady (1995) provides anecdotal evidence that this deeper commitment improves companies’ 
possibilities to create sustainable competitive advantage.  
11 Some employee ownership cases involve formal employee participation in decisions (particularly in cooperatives), 
while others involve no change in workplace decision making. Just as the size of the ownership stake seems to 
make very little difference in employee satisfaction and commitment, it is not important in either perceived or 
desired participation or influence. Actual participation levels were perceived to be higher for employee-owners in 
two cooperatives (Rhodes & Steers 1981, Russell, et al 1979), and for certain groups of workers in two studies 
(Goldstein 1978, Hammer, et al 1982; Kruse 1984), but Long (1979, 1981, 1982) found no significant differences. 
Whether or not employee ownership results in changes in workplace decision making, one might imagine that 
employee ownership raises employee desires and expectations for participation in decisions. While this idea is 
borne out in some case studies and interviews, it does not receive much support in the attitude surveys. Hammer & 
Stern (1980) and Kruse (1984) found that ownership status made no difference in desired participation or allocation 
of power in two studies. Long (1981, 1982) found a decline in desired worker participation after an employee 
buyout. He speculates that company growth made employees wary about worker participation given the uncertainty 
about commitment levels of new employees, and that employee ownership may have made employees put more 
trust in managers to make decisions maximizing firm value. 
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Greater Motivation? 
ESOPs are not always associated with higher motivation (Kruse 1984), but studies generally find 
(slightly) higher motivation in employee-owned firms. The link between size of stake and motivation 
is not strong, but Goldstein (1978) found expressed motivation related to size of stake in an 
Australian firm saved by employee buyout. Long (1978a, 1978b, 1980, 1982) found motivation 
related to perceived participation in decisions. 
The only direct link from motivation to firm performance is made by Russell et al. (1982) who 
found higher quality of work among employee-owners (fewer customer complaints). 
Increased Employee Effort?  
One means by which employee ownership might improve firm performance is through greater 
effort or dedication, measurable in variables such as reduced turnover and absenteeism. Table 4 
summarizes six studies that provide some behavioral measures that could improve overall firm 
performance. Once again, simple existence of employee ownership appears to have no automatic 
effect on dedication, but may have an effect combined with worker participation or influence. Kruse 
(1984) found no reduction in turnover or grievances in an ESOP that was sold without worker vote 
or input. Rhodes and Steers (1981) and Buchko (1992) found lower turnover, whereas Hammer et al. 
(1982) did not. One study on injury levels found lower rates associated with employee ownership 
(Rooney, 1992) whereas one did not (Rhodes & Steers, 1981); three studies on absenteeism all had 
differing results. 
Reduced Salaries and Other Expenses? 
Buchko (1992) hypothesized that ESOPs strengthen employees' commitment to the company as 
well as to motivate employees to, for example, lower their salaries and other expenses. Evidence 
suggests, however, that employee wages, at least, are actually higher in employee-owned firms.  
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Table 4. Effects of Employee Ownership on Effort and Dedication 
Authors Source of data Dependent variables Explanatory variables Main results 
Kruse
(1984)
Manufacturing co. with 
ESOP owning 52% of 
stock, 1981 
Turnover, 
Union 
grievances 
ESOP termination 
Turnover and grievance rates 
unchanged after company was sold 
(without worker vote or input)
Rhodes 
& Steers 
(1981) 
141 employees at a 
US Plywood coop vs. 
a conventional firm 
Turnover, Grievances, 
Absenteeism 
Tardiness, Injuries 
Co-op membership 
Lower turnover and grievances in 
co-op; no difference in accidents, 
but higher absenteeism & tardiness 
Buchko
(1992, 
1993)
Survey of 218 
employees in an ESOP 
company, 1987 
Turnover 
Perceived influence, 
ESOP account value. 
Satisfaction with ESOP
Perceived influence and ESOP 
Satisfaction  decreased turnover. 
Account value indirectly 
decreased turnover.
Hammer,
Landau, 
& Stern 
(1982) 
Attendance data from 
112 employees in 
furniture co. before and 
after 1976 buyout 
Absenteeism Employee purchase of ownership stake 
No significant change in overall 
absenteeism, some decrease in 
"voluntary" absenteeism, especially 
with large capital stake 
Rooney 
(1992) 
275 US firms, 206 
majority employee-
owned through ESOP 
or cooperative 
OSHA injury 
in 1985 
Percent of stock held by 
employees, alone and 
with participation 
measures 
Employee ownership with worker 
participation had lower injuries, but 
mixed results for measures 
individually
Improved Labor-Management Relations? 
Although Kelso and others speculated that employee ownership would improve labor-
management relations, ten studies on labor-management relations indicate no decrease in the 
perceived need for the union, nor reduced employee commitment to union activities. French and 
Rosenstein (1984) found that both owners and non-owners had increasingly favorable views of 
union-management cooperation. Not one out of the ten studies, however, indicates a perceived 
decrease in the need for union representation, but three studies indicate a perceived increase. This 
may be attributable to ESOP structures that provide ownership but not necessarily any formal voting 
rights. Employees in these firms now feel they need a union not only to protect rights associated with 
the jobs, but also to protect their financial stake in the firm.  
Skepticism about Performance of ESOPs and/or Employee Ownership 
Although most ESOP and employee ownership researchers find improved firm performance, 
mainstream economic theorists and many investigators still see employee ownership as suspect. Most 
economists predict either underinvestment and inefficient decision-making, inadequate supervision, 
or both (see Bonin et al., 1993, for a review).  
This circumspection over the viability of employee ownership was compounded by the use of 
ESOPs in the 1980s as a takeover defense. Employee ownership would seem to imply distribution of 
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power and control, but because of the legal structure of some ESOPs vesting full fiduciary power in 
management, ESOPs can and have been used as defensive control mechanisms (Pugh et al., 1999). 
ESOPs are an effective takeover defense because they increase both the number of shares under 
management control and corporate debt -- making them simultaneously less vulnerable and less 
attractive. Beatty (1994) and Scholes and Wolfson (1990) claimed that the increase in ESOPs in the 
1980s was largely prompted by the surge at the time in hostile corporate takeovers.  
Concentration of Control and Management Entrenchment 
Nasar (1989) contended that ESOPs can eventually harm shareholders because the plans can 
entrench weak or ineffective management while offering little motivation for employees to become 
more productive. Gordon and Pound (1990) suggested that ESOPs were less effective than other 
types of large investors at monitoring management decisions since ESOPs are unilaterally undertaken 
by management, ESOP shares are held only by incumbent managerial and non-managerial 
employees, and ESOP trustees are frequently appointed by management. 
In sharp contrast to the findings of Blasi and Kruse (2003), Pugh et al. (2000) claim that, “The 
literature, to date, has generally provided inconsistent results.” In their own study, they conclude that 
ESOPs provide, at best, only a short-term boost to corporate performance. In a current paper (Pugh 
et al., forthcoming), however, the authors make a more competent case that some ESOPs have been 
used by corporations as part of a takeover defense and that these ESOPs do not outperform the 
market (but others do).  
Other works seem to support this notion of differential ESOP outcomes depending on motive. 
Park and Seng (1995) documented that the market reacts unfavorably to ESOP adoptions when it 
seems to concentrate management control, but reacts favorably to ESOP adoptions when other large 
outside shareholders are present who have the capability to offset the influence of inefficient 
managers who might choose to use the ESOP to further entrench themselves in their positions. 
Gamble (1998) found that ESOPs adopted prior to the availability of the tax benefits provided by the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) experienced improved financial performance on six observed 
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financial ratios, while the performance of ESOP firms adopted after the passage of the Act declined 
on each ratio observed. The sample of 32 pre-TRA firms significantly outperformed a 147 post-TRA 
sample on three of six financial ratios observed. The study's results suggest that firms that adopted 
ESOPs prior to the availability of Tax Reform Act benefits have successfully reduced agency costs 
and that many firms that adopted plans after the passage of the Act may have likely done so for 
reasons other than incentive alignment.  
Insulated and Non-Innovative 
Gamble (2000) argues that the basic problem with management entrenchment is insulation and 
failure to innovate. He documents that as ESOP stock concentration increases, R&D spending 
declines. He posits that an entrenched management behaves in a risk-reducing manner and decreases 
its commitment to innovation.  
A Threat to Firm Survival 
Based on the case of United Airlines, Lamberg et al. (2003) argued that employee stock 
ownership programs could threaten a firm's survival. Lamberg argues that lack of central authority 
caused suboptimal strategic stakeholder negotiation at United Airlines, causing the firm to fall into 
bankruptcy (and employees to lose their investment). The empirical generalizability of the United 
Airlines case is dubious because most observers considered it an ill-conceived structure from the 
start. On the other hand, internal negotiations and suboptimization is a general economic problem, 
for which the Theory of the (conventionally governed) Firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) is a solution, and ESOP proponents’ failure to address the questions lead 
economists to see United Airlines as more representative than ESOP proponents do.  
Gaps and Shortcomings in Research on ESOP Effects upon Firms  
Like many academic areas of inquiry, studies on ESOPs have more to do with internal lines of 
development than problems of the firms themselves. In our conversations with ESOP CEOs and 
other officers, we identify problems completely unaddressed in the literature, e.g., capital formation, 
maintaining liquidity, managing retirements and payouts. There are often problems between “haves” 
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– employees who reap a windfall from participation in the initial plan adoption – and “have-nots,” – 
employees doing the same work, sometimes with greater skill and education, but who do not share in 
the big gains. There are, in fact, many issues unique to employee-owned firms including, perhaps, 
some those hypothesized in the economics literature; but among the hundreds of empirical studies 
done, virtually none address, or even identify, these issues. 
Empirical Shortcomings  
Even viewing the research on ESOP firm level effects on its own terms, most studies, and the 
research in its entirety fails to follow through and thoroughly document their findings. Blasi, Kruse, 
Rosen, Logue and others provide data and statistics indicating that employee ownership may 
supersede even Kelso’s rosiest predictions. The assertions are astonishing. By most empirical 
accounts, ESOPs are highly productive and profitable; they survive longer, and achieve a higher rate 
of shareholder return. If Blasi et al. (2003) are correct, firms could give away 8% of the company to 
employees and still expect to come out 2% ahead. Unfortunately, few employee ownership authors 
publish in peer reviewed journals, especially not top tier journals. Even the best employee ownership 
researchers such as Blasi and Kruse often do not provide their data and documentation. Their claim 
of an average 2% return on investment after 8% dilution is difficult to accept without full data 
disclosure and peer review.12
The economic and finance literature which is skeptical about employee ownership and/or ESOPs 
is even weaker both in quantity and quality of empirical studies. In Pugh et al. (2000), of the few such 
empirical articles, citations are wrong and in conflict. For example, the authors state, “Conte and 
Tannenbaum (1978) and Tannenbaum et al. (1984) found no significant correlation between ESOP 
ownership and profitability.” In the next paragraph, they say, “Conte and Tannenbaum (1978) 
reported that employee-owned firms were 1.5 times more profitable than those employing more 
12 Even aside from the general requirement to see the data and the calculations and a breakdown of the numbers, the 
book leaves some basic questions unanswered. For example: Are tax benefits part of the equation; what 
component does that represent, if any, of shareholder return? How quickly does this “bump” happen? They explain 
the “the higher levels are sustained indefinitely,” but when exactly does the level rise?  
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traditional ownership structures.” To top it off, the citation is wrong. 13 The Conte and Tannenbaum 
study itself fails to show N’s for the research. 
Theoretical Shortcomings  
To make the case for employee ownership at the higher levels of intellectual discourse also 
requires theoretical development. Economic theory suggests important challenges for employee 
ownership. If employee-owned firms succeed, how does it happen? Is economic theory wrong? How 
so? Empirics are important, but so is theory. Until theory is developed, scientists will remain 
circumspect, particularly given a lack of rigor in the presentation of empirical findings.  
Proponents likewise do not answer some obvious practical questions: What part, if any, of ESOP 
performance gain is due to tax benefits? And, if ESOPs do so well, why are there not more of them? 
The number of ESOP plans in effect has grown only very slowly over the past decade and a half 
(Table 1).  
Mechanisms  
If scientists are circumspect about data without theory, managers and policy-makers are even 
more suspect about claims without mechanisms. It does limited good to say that employee-owned 
firms achieve better performance unless one is able to say when, how and why. Yet questions about 
mechanisms are almost entirely unanswered: how exactly do employee-owned firms achieve better 
performance? Aside from failing to fully document the relationship, some important variables seem 
overlooked entirely. One cannot simply assume that ownership shares result in increased motivation 
and thereby performance; in fact, the findings suggest that there are no such direct links.  
There is, rather, an indication in the Craig and Pencavel (1992, 1993, 1995) studies that flexibility 
13 Managerial and Decision Economics is peer reviewed (so much for that safeguard). I did not obtain Tannenbaum et 
al. (1984), which they list as a Research Report, University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center. Nor did I obtain 
Weston et al. (1990), of whom they write: 
… in their review of the literature through 1986, concluded that ESOPs have not led to significant increases in 
corporate performance. 
 When I was able to track down Conte and Tannenbaum (1978) – in Monthly Labor Review, not the more rigorous 
Academy of Management Review that they listed, I learned that it was a simple, inconclusive study suggesting that 
employee-owned firms were, in fact, more profitable. 
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plays an important role in the success of plywood cooperatives. Firms with motivated, highly 
participative employee-owners may more readily adapt to environmental change than their 
counterparts do. Another suggestive mechanism is resilience. Studies such as Iqbal et al. (2000) 
suggest that the survival advantage, and even the performance advantage, of employee ownership 
may be a willingness and ability to come together under adversity. If so, employee ownership 
provides yet another firm-, employee-, and community-level benefit – smoothing out the ups and 
downs of economic cycles. 
Dialectical Shortcomings  
Ideally, ESOP proponents would seriously engaged their critics and the critiques, and make the 
case for employee ownership at the higher levels of intellectual discourse. Trying to reconcile the two 
distinct streams of research should be illuminating. If, in fact, proponents and critics are both correct, 
employee owned firms may be accomplishing even more than anyone is now suggesting. Critics are 
almost certainly correct in saying that some significant percentage of poor performing firms that have 
adopted ESOPs for reasons that have nothing to do with the spirit of employee ownership, but 
rather as a legal loophole to protect and entrench inefficient management. Researchers also 
document that a large percentage of well intentioned firms apparently do not gain anywhere near the 
full benefit of ESOP adoption; studies indicate only those with high levels of participation reap the 
benefits of employee ownership. (In many firms, it is a largely unappreciated benefit; anecdotal 
evidence indicates that employees greatly undervalue their ownership shares.)  
If ESOPs nevertheless, on average, outperform the market by 10% despite these laggards, it 
suggests that firms which adopt ESOPs in the spirit of the employee ownership and participation 
may be doing astoundingly better than comparison firms. 
Effects of Employee Ownership on Society 
In contrast to the abundance of research on the effects of employee ownership on individuals 
and on firms, very limited research has been conducted on the effects of employee ownership on 
society. The social case for employee ownership is stronger in rhetoric than in research. Kelso and 
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associates (1958, 1986), Greenberg (1978), Long and others have claimed the ownership builds 
commitment, could ease workplace tensions, reduce disparities of wealth, and help build a better 
society. But little research has been conducted which might justify the claims of advocates that 
ESOPs and employee ownership help builds a better society.  
Economic Growth  
The few studies suggesting social goods above and beyond those that benefit employee owners 
and the firms themselves pertain to economic growth. Kumbhakar and Dunbar (1993) found 
significantly higher sales growth among 123 U.S. public firms that adopted ESOPs or profit-sharing 
plans between the years 1982-1987. Rosen and Quarrey (1987) found that a sample of ESOP firms 
outperformed a non-ESOP control group in terms of sales and employment growth and that the 
sales growth of the sample of ESOP firms significantly improved after ESOP adoption. Rosen (1989) 
found similar results with a smaller sample of 20 ESOP firms.  
Quarrey and Rosen (1993) and Winther and Marens (1997) compared companies before and after 
the adoption of ESOPs, and found faster employment growth after ESOP adoption, particularly 
among firms that had greater levels of employee participation in decision-making. In a study of Ohio 
firms, Logue and Yates (2001) also found that ESOPs grew faster than their industry counterparts 
did. These six studies indicate nearly two-and-a-half percentage points greater annual sales and 
employment growth among ESOPs as compared to conventional counterpart firms. It can be argued 
that this represents a clear societal benefit not only in terms of expanded economic activity, but an 
expanded tax base as well.  
Reducing Inequality?  
One of the high hopes of ESOP legislation was the prospect that employee ownership could help 
mitigate the disparities in wealth that capitalism foments. Study, however, has been limited. One of 
the few studies on the wealth distribution effects of ESOPs has been Kardas et al.’s (1998) 
Washington State study. The principal finding, presented in Table 5, was that, although average and 
low-level workers did considerably better within ESOPs than in comparable companies, those at the 
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high end of the pay scale did even better.  
Table 5. Hourly Wages for ESOP and Control Companies 
ESOP
companies
Control
companies Difference 
Mean hourly wage $19.09 $17.00 12.29%
Median hourly wage $14.72 $13.58 8.39%
Hourly wage at 10th percentile $8.85 $8.47 4.49%
Hourly wage at 90th percentile $30.91 $26.12 18.34%
Ratio of 90th to 10th 3.49 3.08
The outcome seems to raise doubts as to whether ESOPs are the wealth distribution tool that 
Kelso and Long foresaw. But wages are only one element of income; ESOPs explicitly promote not 
equality of wages, but rather a broader distribution of capital earnings and gains. Onaran (1992) 
conducted a broader study of intra-firm inequality, measuring by means of survey questions 
disparities of wealth, decision-making and status in three small employee-owned and seven other 
firms (all in Ohio). He found intra-firm inequality lower in employee-owned firms on most measures. 
If, in fact, ESOPs fail to reduce income distributions, why is that? It is not necessarily a function of 
employee ownership per se; rather it may be a function of voting rights, for example. 
“Spillover”: The Participating Worker and Better Citizenship  
Greenberg (1978) speculated on a “spillover” effect from employee ownership. At the time that 
Kelso and Long were promoting the idea of ESOPs, political theorist Carole Pateman (1970) was 
suggesting industrial democracy as a means to encourage political democracy. The question has taken 
on new salience given the continuing decline in various forms of political and civic participation in 
the United States (Conway, 2000; Putnam, 2000). I could find no study directly testing the link 
between employee ownership and citizenship, but political scientists have begun investigating the 
relationship between workplace participation and citizenship. Schur et al. (2005) looked at the 
implementation of a high involvement work system (HIWS), using both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal comparisons. Political efficacy did not change overall, but increased in one department 
where the HIWS was strongly supported and very successful, and decreased in another department 
characterized by bad labor-management relations and little management support. The authors 
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conclude that social connections, a sense that one’s work is meaningful, and positive labor-
management relations can increase workers’ feelings of political efficacy. 
Gaps in the Research on Social Effects 
Although benefits to individuals and firms from ESOP adoption are all well and good, for 
matters of public policy, questions about the social benefits and costs of employee ownership are 
paramount. Yet this research barely exists. Some important unaddressed issues include:  
Benefits to Society of Widespread Ownership Stakes 
It is widely presumed that home ownership is a cornerstone of society, adding stability to 
neighborhoods, and anchoring people in the civic life. Presumably, some research exists to back up 
these claims. It would seem parallel to claim the comparable importance of work ownership. “The 
Ownership Society” was a phrase used during the creation of ESOPs, and it will likely be used as 
justification for maintained or increased public support for employee ownership. It is not easy to 
operationalize, measure, and document such social goods; but such research would be invaluable in 
any effort to promote public support. 
Social benefits may also extend to clients, suppliers, and other external stakeholders. Because 
employees have rich links to the community, the community likely benefits by having employee-
owners. As compared with straightforward measures such as sales or employment growth, using 
ownership stake or stakeholder relations as intervening variables is not easy, but stakeholder studies 
and theory (e.g., Freeman 1984; Friedman & Miles 2002) are fairly well established and could also 
provide the data and theory that might justify further public support.  
Continuity and Orderly Transition 
Social benefits can also arise from continuity and orderly transition. Firm survival is not generally 
understood by economists as a social benefit, and may even be seen as a social cost, the failure of the 
old to die and make way for new, innovative firms. Research on resilience however (e.g., Freeman, 
2004), suggests that there is a major social gain from organizations that survive – people need time to 
fit into an organization, teams need time to coalesce, organizations take years to develop successful 
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business models –  and a loss from lack of organizational continuity. Markets provide only crude 
mechanisms for reallocating resources. Bankruptcy and other breakups result in the disintegration 
intellectual capital. Start-ups, for all their vibrancy, are generally inefficient. When individuals, teams, 
and organizations break up frequently, clients and other stakeholders often go poorly served. In 
short, the current model of transfer every two or three years may result in great social losses; if 
employee ownership, in fact, allows for resilient, organizations that can withstand adversity and adapt 
to changing circumstances, they may add a greatly beneficial stability to an all-too-rapidly changing 
economy and society. 
Explicit Acknowledgment of ESOP Costs and Quantification of Benefits  
One big reason why ESOPs may flourish is the big federal tax incentive given to founders and 
family owners when they sell thirty percent or more to employees. From a public policy perspective, 
it would be helpful to try to quantify in some weigh the social benefits, and to acknowledge explicitly 
and calculate the costs to US taxpayers. 
Conclusions and Implications for Further Research  
The surprisingly large volume of research on ESOPs and employee ownership is overwhelmingly 
positive and largely credible. Nevertheless, it remains on the outskirts of academic theory. To raise 
the level of understanding and impact would require methodological variety and innovation as well as 
increased rigor, filling in some important gaps, and fully engaging the agnostics and the critics. 
Methods 
ESOP research has overwhelming used written surveys. Because all methodologies have their 
limitations, using a single method yields one-dimensional results. Complementing survey research 
with open ended interviews, experimental studies, action research, and case studies, including 
matched pairs and ethnographies could enrich the understanding dramatically. Methodological 
creativity is especially important in trying to document some of less tangible benefits such as 
improved stakeholder relations. Well-focused surveys on theoretical questions could also shed light 
on some of the larger questions of interest to economics, sociology, management, and political 
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science.  
Gaps in the ESOP/ Employee Ownership Research 
In the sections above, I have identified several important gaps in the literature: 
 The outcomes for the owners who lead the transition 
 Identify and address real problems faced by employee owned firms   
 Rigorous documentation of firm performance benefits 
o What part of, if any, of this advantage is due to tax advantages?  
o How well do firms that adopt participation policies and voting rights do? 
 Mechanisms by which employee ownership leads to better performance (e.g., the role of 
flexibility, resilience, commitment, identification, and motivation) 
 Explanation of why new growth of employee ownership is stagnant 
 Theoretical explanations for the desirability, benefits, and challenges of employee ownership 
 Reconcile data and empirical findings on employee ownership with existing theory of the firm 
findings from distinct fields, and received wisdom 
 Explicit acknowledgment of ESOP costs and quantification of benefits 
 Documentation of social benefits   
o the role of ESOPs in enabling continuity & orderly transition  
o benefits of (employee) ownership stake and ownership society 
Differentiating ESOPs 
ESOPs are an unusual, even quirky, corporate form. The finance literature seems to have made 
an insightful distinction between firms that have adopted ESOPs for reasons that have nothing to do 
with the spirit of employee ownership, with those that do. Likewise, management researchers have 
drawn an important insight about the importance of participation. Further study should identify the 
differences between firms that encourage and facilitate broad participation with those that provide 
ESOPs strictly as a financial (retirement) benefit; between firms that provide voting rights with those 
that do not; and comparative study based on extent of employee stake and participation. 
Predicting ESOP Adoption and Conditions which Give Rise to Employee Ownership 
An additional gap that falls outside these categories is prediction of the conditions which give rise 
to employee ownership and what firms will adopt ESOPs. This is useful both as a test of 
understanding how much, if anything, we really know about them and useful for understanding the 
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benefits perceived by those who adopt them.  
One beginning towards understanding this is the survey by Hochner and Granrose (1985) of 943 
supermarket employees facing shutdown. To avert shutdown, organizers asked for an employee 
pledge of $5000 to buy out the stores. The authors found that entrepreneurial ideals (risk-taking, 
importance of ownership) and collective/participative ideals predicted willingness to pledge for 
employee buyout. 
Abundant Research, Strong Data, but Still a Fringe Phenomenon 
Research on the employee ownership parallels the phenomenon of employee ownership itself. 
For all the potential appeal and in fact, the extent of, employee ownership, it goes unheralded. A 
move to the front and center stage of political life and economic theory could be aided by an attempt 
to publish in more mainstream journals. 
This will require, in many cases, more stringent documentation and presentation of methods, 
more active consideration of alternate perspectives, including open acknowledgement of critiques of 
ESOP law and practice, and employee ownership in general. The data and arguments on the merits 
of employee ownership and ESOPs are strong; there is no good reason that they remain on the 
fringes of academic, political, and social consciousness. 
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